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Abstract
In these days exists a growing rate of cybercrime, in both, number and complexity of the attacks
that are being made . This crime is becoming more powerful, persistent, costly and targeting by
the day. Preventing and detecting this dangerous situation is key to protect any Internet based
company, and, because of this, security best practices are followed, firewalls are implemented,
and very distinct Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) are de-
veloped. All types of IDS have their strengths but are not perfect: they can fail to detect some
specially crafted attacks, not have enough processing speed to deal with the threat or even assum-
ing a certain connection to be an attack while it is not.
In the state of the art are presented solutions to make IDS better, addressing the problems
discussed before, that serve as a starting point for this dissertation. We aim to take advantage of
data mining algorithms and Big Data technology to implement a distributed computing platform
that serves as an anomaly-based IDS, therefore expecting to increase the processing speed and
number of packets processed and stored, while maintaining a high intrusion detection ratio.
In order to conclude the proposed goal, the developed platform is going to be tested and studied
in a controlled environment where legit connections are made and different types of cyber attacks
are simulated, such as Denial Of Service (DOS), brute force attempts and probing, and after that
the results obtained are to be compared with the state of the art solutions.
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Introduction
1.1 Context
Data Mining is the non-trivial process of finding hidden patterns in data and, because of the value
of the information obtained, it is the key to success in many businesses world wide. Many Compa-
nies were already collecting all types of information from their clients, but with Data Mining they
can now try to understand or predict the needs and behaviors of everyone in their database. There
have been many contributions to data mining by statisticians, mathematics and data scientists who
invented different types of algorithms for problems such as clustering, classification, regression
among others.
With the growing rate of the volume of data that is produced and stored it became trending
to speak of Big Data, a term used to refer to very large data sets that couldn’t be processed the
usual way due to both time consumed and volume used. This new approach allowed companies
to expand even further their knowledge of the huge amount of information they have stored, for
instance the health care companies that use IBM’s big data and analytics platform registered a
20% decrease in patient mortality by analyzing streaming patient data [1].
There are several different frameworks that work in big data, the most used being Hadoop, a
java open source Apache platform for reliable, scalable, distributed computing [2] that answers the
problem of how to efficiently handle very large data sets. With all its modules, Hadoop can single
handedly distribute the data in a high-throughput access cluster and create jobs to efficiently query
all information in record time, when compared to the same query without distributed computing
[3].
One of the uses of data mining is detecting intrusion and fraud, in different kinds of systems,
which has been subjected to extensive research in order to better protect users against all kinds of
threats. Still, the efforts are not enough and companies are getting attacked each day. A survey by
Kaspersky concluded that 91% of the organizations polled was victim to cyber attacks [4], and the
proportion for different types of attacks are shown in Figure 1.1. Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
try to fight this problem, and one way to enhance them is to apply Big Data technology to scale
already existing data mining algorithms used to detect intrusion, therefore getting the benefits from
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Figure 1.1: Different attacks and respective proportion [4]
distributed computing while maintaining a good detection rate for the algorithm. This will be the
main focus for this dissertation.
1.2 Motivation
Data Mining has been used on several applications in very distinct fields where it met success,
such as Banking, Customer Relationship Management, Education and Security. Internet network
and traffic logs were no exception and with the rising of cyber attacks, there was a need to prevent
this dangerous situation from happening so easily. This motivated the use of IDS and Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS) that were used to deny access to problematic users, along side with
firewalls and other techniques, so web servers,Local Area Network (LAN) and personal computers
could be safer. Due to the amount of logs that can be produced for network traffic, understanding
the information hidden in this data can be very helpful for intrusion detection. Because of this,
anomaly-based IDS are developed based on data mining problems and algorithms that usually
work by trying to define what is good traffic and what is not, taking actions to block what the
software computes as an attack. There are many algorithms used in this particular type of IDS,
and all of them try to minimize the false positive ratio while still managing to successfully detect
most incoming attacks.
Some IDS implementations are employed only in one host. The capturing of network packets
can be done by this host or sent to it by a cluster of computers, but the processing done by the IDS
to evaluate the integrity of the packets is only has good as the computer doing the job. This makes
for a single point of failure that can potentially lead to a breach in the network, making it vulnerable
against many cyber attacks. A big data approach to this problem can lead to a distributed IDS with
much more processing capability and storage capacity, meaning that the data mining techniques
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applied can have better and faster results than with only one node, which translates to a better
intrusion detection system that can help corporations world wide.
1.3 Objectives
The main goal of this thesis is to study what data mining algorithms are able to scale with dis-
tributed computing, and then apply some of them to laboratory created traffic for studying their
ability to detect intrusion with recent attacks. We are expecting that this system will have a great
impact on intrusion detection, by having the same or better results with the data mining techniques
that are being used in one host IDS while also gaining all the benefits from Hadoop and distributed
computing.
The main milestones for this thesis are as follows:
• Learning and using Hadoop and it’s components while studying the major alternatives that
deal with intrusion detection and Big Data;
• Analyze the efficiency of different data mining algorithms when distributed computing is
applied and test them on the KDD99 dataset [5], a database that’s being used by several
researches on IDS and, despite being from 1999, it still has attacks that are in use today.
• The final step will require the creation of a controlled environment, with both legitimate
traffic and different kinds of cyber attacks, to collect and analyze it with the learnings ob-
tained in the step before, in order to compare it to other existing solutions, explained in the
state of the art.
1.4 Structure
The rest of this document is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 is presented the state of the art about
solutions that address enhancement for IDS and to different data mining algorithms, followed by
related work done in distributed computing applying the Hadoop framework for scalability and
availability. Chapter 3 presents the planned methodology that will serve to complete the Objectives
mentioned. A work plan is presented and explained in Chapter 4 and finally some conclusions
about the thesis are given in Chapter 5.
4 Introduction
Chapter 2
State Of The Art
In this chapter is presented a simplistic view on solutions done so far to enhance the effectiveness
of IDS, varying from different types of detection to different algorithms used, and uses of big data
and Hadoop for cyber security.
A brief explanation on IDS is given in section 2.1.In section 2.2 we present software and
research in the field of network monitoring and packet analysis, which will be important for this
dissertation goals. In section 2.3 are showed improved results for data mining algorithms used for
intrusion detection, all tested with the famous KDD99 dataset. In section 2.4 is explained recent
improvements done in the field of distributed computing, and some uses for intrusion detection.
Finally a summary of the chapter is given in section 2.5.
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
One principal part of this dissertation are IDS, that are in charge of protecting their users against
the growing rate of attacks and defending them against external and internal threats. They play a
major part in security and can be characterized in three different aspects: how they find intrusion,
what action is done when said intrusion is found, and lastly where they are applied. Understanding
this distinctions is essential to correctly implement any IDS solution and in this section is explained
each of this different aspects, and how they interconnect, and also work related for this different
types of detection is presented.
As for how IDS work, they can either be Signature Based IDS or Statistical anomaly-based
IDS. The first type has access to a database with known signature attacks and the software com-
pares the incoming network packets with those in the database to determine if the traffic matches,
or not, to a cyber attack and then can act accordingly. Snort is a example for this type of IDS
and is further explained in Section 2.2.3. Signature based IDS will struggle to protect the user
against first day attacks, advanced persistent threats and even attacks that just change some bytes
in the payload of the traffic to purposely pass through the filter as a legitimate connection. They
also have problems with the amount of false positives that are triggered and their efficiency drops
if there is too much data to process, called data overload. In the other hand, anomaly-based IDS
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make use of data mining algorithms to classify traffic as legitimate or an attack. This detection
type has better results where signature-based ones fail, meaning that attacks that have no recorded
signature can be detected by not falling under the patterns for what is considered normal activity
in the network and data overload is easily handled by data reduction techniques. Anomaly-based
IDS will be the target of study in this dissertation, and recent work in enhancing algorithm for this
particular application can be seen in section 2.3.2.
When a IDS detects an intrusion, it can handle that situation in different manners. Usually
there are two distinct approaches: a passive or a reactive IDS. Passive IDS limit themselves
on simply alerting the network manager that a possible intrusion was detected, by writing this
information on a log file or starting an alarm, the network manager will then have to look at this
logs and take action accordingly. The reactive way actually blocks, or denies, the connection
automatically without alerting the person in charge previously. This type of IDS, also known
as IPS, can also prevent even more attacks from happening depending of its configuration, for
example it can block any communications from a certain Internet Protocol (IP) address that was
considered as an attacker.
There is one more way to define IDS, and that is in which scenario they are employed, being
either Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) or Host-based Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (HIDS). In an HIDS environment security software, such as antivirus, firewalls or SNORT,
is installed in every single computer that belongs to the network and this softwares work inde-
pendently, aiming to detect and prevent attacks, either external or internal, that target any user.
NIDS are employed in well defined access points, such as web servers or gateways, that are key to
maintaining the availability of the company using them. In this case, the main goal of using NIDS
is to protect important services and control the attacks that come from the outside of the network.
Because the evolution of cyber attacks is eminent, IDS also need to adapt. Researchers are
trying to enhance IDS in order to better protect users and diminish the negative results that an
attack can do. One of the common problems of IDS are, that in a busy network, a signature-
based implementation with regular rule sets can produce a enormous amount of alerts, some more
important than others, and analyzing all of them is impossible for a network administrator. Usually
the solution is to apply correlation and clustering to the alert data. In [6] a solution to this problem
was arranged, by developing a extra software, called EDGe, that calculated the correlation between
the alerts in order to detect recurring behavior, and using this information to find hosts infected
with malware that could compromise the integrity of the network. Testing with a nine month
long IDS alert logs proved that EDGe could find 60% more infections than other solutions, while
keeping the false positives at 15%. Another approach to this problem is shown in [7] where the
alerts were captured from a university backbone, with Snort, and then used to study what types
of correlation would produce better and faster results, while implementing a distributed platform
to perform this analysis, taking advantage of hash tables to store results making the process even
faster.
Because networks are very distinct from each other, in size, servers, software or hardware
used, no IDS implementation is ever going to be the same and have the exact same results. For
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Figure 2.1: A ping captured with TCPDump
this reason, different IDS frameworks have been developed, with several applications in mind, for
instance there as been interest in using an IDS to protect mobile ad hoc networks [8]. Another
framework was proposed in [9] where the goal was to developed a scalable IPS, where both HIDS
and NIDS were applied, while also making use of a correlation software to analyze logs. If an
attack was detected in any host, that information could be propagated to the rest of the network, in
an attempt to block the attacking IP address.
2.2 Network Monitoring And Packet Logging
Since the beginning of LANs, network administrators had the need to capture and monitor the
traffic that passed through their network. For this purpose exists a vast range of software that can
successfully monitor a network and log the connections. Some of the most common tools for
monitoring are presented next, and they may come with a graphical interface, may be open-source
and may have unique and/or extra features, but they all can serve as a backbone to a intrusion
detection system.
2.2.1 TCPdump
TCPdump is a libcap based packet analyzer [10]. It does not have a graphical interface, instead all
information is showed on the command line. When a capture is started, TCPDump prints infor-
mation about the packets that are going through a predetermined network interface. When using
the verbose flag (-v) TCPDump displays the packet timestamp; several layer three IP headers like
flags, offset and Time To Live (TTL); source and destination IP address and port used; about the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) it shows what flags are active, the checksum, both acknowl-
edgement and sequence number, the window size and packet length. The capture of a simple ping
command can be viewed in figure 2.1.
Some of TCPDump major features are printing the information in ascii or hexadecimal, record-
ing and reading the packets, limit for the size of the destination file and number of packets and
even filters for protocol used, port and IP address are available.
2.2.2 Wireshark
Any student that starts to learn about networking, is also going to learn about Wireshark. This is
one of the most used protocol analyzer [11], and considered one of the most important open-source
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Figure 2.2: A ping captured with Wireshark
applications of all time [12].
Wireshark has many different features and a great community updating it as necessary. It
is mainly used for the ability to perform deep inspection to hundreds of different protocols in a
simple graphical interface. The packets can be recorded to different formats, like TCPDump’s
libcap, and can be read from Ethernet, Bluetooth, Frame Relay and others. It features a very
strong filter option allowing great precision in finding a packet in the middle of all capture data,
and can even support decryption for the most used protocols in cryptography such as Secure Socket
Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS),Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and Wi-Fi Protected
Access 2 (WPA2) among others. In figure 2.2 it is possible to see two ping echo request packets
and corresponding replies using Wireshark.
2.2.3 SNORT
SNORT is a open source signature based IDS that is capable of real time traffic analysis and packet
logging [14].It is a highly used intrusion detection system because it is a very lightweight software,
has simple implementation, a great community that updates the filter rules on a daily basis with
very good efficiency in detecting and preventing attacks with documented signatures.
Although SNORT was made for detecting intruders and attacks, it can also work as a packet
logger only. To make the detection system work, one can simply write rules, or download the rule
set from SNORT website, and the software will compare all packets that pass through an interface
with all the rules active at the time.If any of the packets are matched by a rule the software can
either alert the user, log, drop, ignore or even reject the connection based on what was specified
previously in the rule. The language for this is simple and efficient and the structure for this rules
can be seen in figure 2.3 with an example and explanation.
Figure 2.3: A standard for Snort rules [13].
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2.3 KDD99 Dataset
Until 2009 the Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) Archive was able to maintain an online
repository with large data sets. Their main goal was to help researchers discover new ways to
scale data analysis algorithms to very large and complex data sets. In 1999 they published a
database prepared by Lincoln Labs in order to motivate research in intrusion detection. This data
set was based of raw TCPDump recorded for nine weeks inside a LAN simulating the behavior
that is expected of a military Air Force Base. After processing all the information obtained the
dataset ended up with about five million connections, where a connection is “a sequence of TCP
packets starting and ending at some well defined times, between which data flows to and from
a source IP address to a target IP address under some well defined protocol” [5]. Each of this
connections can be classified as normal or an attack, and there are four major types of attacks:
Denial Of Service (DOS), unauthorized access from a remote machine, unauthorized access to
local superuser privileges and surveillance and probing.
To this day, this dataset is still used to access the behavior of both new and variations of
algorithms in data mining for intrusion detection, mainly because the theory for the methods of
attack haven’t changed, only the attacks themselves, and it’s easy to compare the results obtained
between different algorithms, for the dataset remains unchanged. Next will be presented some
recent work based on this KDD99 dataset that shows improved results in detecting intrusion.
2.3.1 Classifying Network Traffic
Classification is a much studied supervised data mining problem that focus on identifying which
subset of the population a observation belongs, taking into account the attributes of that partic-
ular observation. Usually a classification model is worked upon a training set, corresponding to
roughly 30% of the entries on the database, and then evaluated in the remaining 70% testing set.
Some common algorithms used for classification are Decision Trees, K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN),
Support Vector Machine (SVM) and the Naive Bayes classifier.
2.3.1.1 Decision Trees
Decision trees and other classifiers have been subjected to extended research in intrusion detec-
tion, because of their precision and speed and they fit very well in the KDD99 set due to all the
entries being already defined as either an attack, and which one, or a normal connection. Differ-
ent classification algorithms are normally compared by their predictive accuracy, speed in which
they complete the learning model, scalability to very large datasets, robustness to noise and if the
knowledge learned is easily interpreted. Decision Trees work by first using a specific decision tree
algorithm, like ID3 or CART, to learn a model for the training set. At the start of this cycle, all the
training observations are at the root of the decision tree, and recursively partitions are made based
on selected attributes until a condition for stopping is achieved. Pruning can also be done in the
middle of cycles to eliminate branches that reflect noisy data.
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In [15] the researchers used the C4.5 algorithm, a improvement of ID3, with and without
pruning, to access if it could be used in intrusion detection successfully by learning the model
with a version of the KDD99 Test Data, containing 3,11,073 connections, and evaluating on 10%
of the KDD99 dataset, composed by 4,94,064 connections. They were able to achieve a 92.81%
accuracy with C4.5 Decision Tree and a even better 95.09% accuracy with C4.5 Decision Tree
with pruning which is a good result for the KDD99 dataset. Real-time capture and analysis of
network packets is mentioned as future work in the paper, which is also one objective of this
dissertation.
2.3.1.2 Support Vector Machines
Support vector machines are also subject of extensive research and can be used for both classifica-
tion and regression problems. SVM first maps the entries of the training set to a higher dimension
and then calculates one or more hyperplanes, using a linear approach, that separates data from
different classes. Kernels are functions used to help find and map the hyperplanes and are one key
part of the success to SVMs. A optimized kernel solution was proposed in [16], and consisted
of firstly reducing the data of the KDD99 dataset with Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and
then making a model out of the training set with SVM, including a automatic selection of param-
eters for the RBF kernel used. The researchers concluded that this method had high efficiency
for detecting intrusions and even outperformed other SVM based solutions. For DOS there was a
0.9940 detection rate and 0.0015 false alarm rate.
Variations of kernels are showing up regularly, and they have been tested with the KDD99
dataset for their accuracy in intrusion detection. For instance the Wavelet kernel has been tested
and proved to be useful, with an accuracy rate of 93.1% and a false positive ratio of 8.7%, while
the traditional RBF kernel achieved only an accuracy of 86.1% and 20.1% false positives and
Gauss kernel sat in the middle with 89.7% accuracy and 14.3% false positive ratio [17]. These
results were made based on only eighteen of the forty one features of each observation in 10% of
theKDD99 data.
2.3.2 Anomaly Detection in Network Traffic
Anomaly detection algorithm, or outliers detection have seen much interest in several fields, like
network intrusion detection and fraud detection, mainly due to their focus on detecting, inside a
big amount of data, small occurrences that are different from the rest. They include algorithms like
clustering, some neural networks and density based techniques like as KNN. The usual problems
and set backs for this type of unsupervised learning, is how to efficiently find this outliers and how
to interpret them. To help research, ELKI is a famous and easy to use open-source software that
performs this types of detection and other unsupervised methods for data mining [18].
2.4 Distributed Computing 11
2.3.2.1 Outlier Detection
A self adaptive IDS framework was proposed in [19]. Using Snort, the system was able to, firstly,
apply all the community rules for incoming traffic. Secondly, the packets were studied for outlier
detection, and if the number of not normal packets found were over a certain threshold, they would
go through another round of data mining, this time with clustering and association algorithms, in
order to form a Snort rule that would be automatically joined with the other rules for detecting
intrusion, thus being a self adapting framework. They had very good detection for DOS and
probing attacks, 100% in both, but the platform failed to find out about brute force and password
guessing attacks and even root access, with a less than 50% detection rate in all test cases.
2.3.2.2 Clustering
Clustering analysis is another subject of study that can be used for anomaly-based detection. In
this case, the entries are grouped into clusters, with each observation inside a cluster having high
similarity between them, but maintaining a low similarity between different clusters. Graph-based
clustering have been proved to achieved 95.3% detection rate with a false positive rate of 2.08%
[20] with a subset of the KDD99 data. In this work is also mentioned that the major problem
encountered was the complexity of the algorithm if the dataset was to be increased in size. We aim
to address this problem in this thesis with the help of distributed computing.
2.4 Distributed Computing
Technology is always evolving. Computers are no exception and the amount of memory and
processing speed are growing each year. But even then, some tasks can not possibly be done, in
due time, by a single computer. Distributed computing is the answer to this problem and it can
coordinate several computers, called a cluster, in order to perform a job simultaneously, therefore
finishing the task quicker. It is necessary to have a middleman managing the interactions between
the computers in the cluster. Hadoop is one of the most used software for distributed computing,
as such, it helps the success of companies like Ebay, Facebook and Google [2].
In this section is presented important research done recently in the field of intrusion detection
while taking advantage of distributed computing, thus maximizing the gains and minimizing the
losses of IDS. In Section 2.4.1 is presented a brief Hadoop introduction, along with some of its
uses and recent work in security and intrusion detection fields.
2.4.1 Hadoop Platform
The Hadoop framework is mainly composed of four modules: the Hadoop Distributed File System
(HDFS) in charge of distributing the data efficiently through the cluster; MapReduce, that handles
the parallel processing of any queries done by the user; YARN, responsible for managing the
clusters; and the Common module, with all the utilities to support the previous modules. An
overview of the framework provided by Hadoop can be seen in Figure 2.4 Over the years there
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Figure 2.4: The Hadoop framework [21].
have been alternatives to Hadoop, like Disco and Storm, but none possesses the simplicity and
convenience of HDFS.
Hadoop, being a open-source project, has had much work to improve its performance and
make it a even better distributed computing platform. MapReduce, one of Hadoop’s key modules
that was developed by Google, has a master-slave architecture and is divided in three steps. The
first one is the map step, where the working nodes, in parallel, apply filtering and sorting to the
data according to the query done by the master node, followed by the shuffle step that redistributes
the data that was mapped before, and finally the reduce step, which shows the final results of
processing a certain query. Because of the importance of this module for the global efficiency
of Hadoop, MapReduce has seen continuous effort to better map and reduce the data. In [22] a
alternative shuffle algorithm was developed, that achieved a average of 8.94% speed increase, with
the best result being 12.41%, testing with a word counter job. A correlation based block placement
algorithm was proposed in [23] that aimed to address a not optimal MapReduce performance when
doing multiple file queries, obtaining a faster response time and processing speed when compared
with the default policy.
2.4.2 Hadoop for Intrusion Detection
Hadoop has been proved to be capable of analyzing IDS logs faster than a single node, when deal-
ing with just four gigabytes of connections, directly captured with SNORT, and a five computer
cluster, the processing speed was up to 398% [3]. This rising in processing speed will be even
more important when dealing with Big Data size files, allowing for a more deep inspection of all
traffic recorded. This was one of the motives to apply this extra knowledge that can be gain with
Hadoop and distributed computing to specific attacks, like detecting phishing webpages [24].
In [25] Hadoop was used to quickly retrieve and analyze the large data sets that originate from
alerts provided by honeypots (a system or server that acts as a trap to intruders). The researchers
created a system for dynamically deploying honeypots that they called Honeydoop which had four
modules: Intrusion Detector (with Snort), Enumerator (finds details of the probed system), Auditor
(running important scripts) and Virtual Honeypot Manager (manages all honeypots). With testing
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was proved that they could generate and process honeypot alerts better than the traditional way of
deploying a honeypot.
There have been experiments with the KDD99 dataset and Hadoop, and for a clustering based
algorithm, above 90% detection rate was achieved with 25 k-means cluster, using twenty thousand
entries [26]. Unfortunately with more than one hundred and fifty thousand connections would
produce inferior results, meaning there is still much work to be done to increase efficiency in
finding intrusions with large data sets.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter were firstly presented an overview of IDS and different software capable of listening
on a network interface and logging all connections that go through. It is important that these
solutions can show the important data about every single packet and record them in a simple order
to ease the use of data mining, while not consuming to much resources and not failing the capture
when the incoming rate of packets is rising, e.g. a DOS attack. Several types of data mining
algorithms, and their respective application for intrusion detection were documented next and
while researchers are achieving better results with anomaly-based IDS they still face problems
with processing speed, amount of packets processed and logged, and a single point of failure.
Distributed Computing and relevant work for intrusion were exposed in section 2.4, proving that
the Hadoop framework can be useful for IDS by correcting the weaknesses found on single host
systems while also being able to have a performance as good as them.
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Chapter 3
Developed Platform: The Hunter
The major objective of this work was to distribute the processing of Snort through several comput-
ers instead of using just one machine that does all the job (sniffing, saving and analyzing traffic)
and study the impacts of this distribution, both on time consumed and efficiency obtained. With
that in mind, the idea of making a platform that could perform this task in a completely automated
and scalable way arose, and The Hunter was born. In the end, with all scripts developed working,
The Hunter was configured to have a cycle behavior. In this cycle it would capture real time traffic,
and at the same time search for intrusions on the packets that were captured in the cycle before.
The time for each detection cycle is completely up to the user.
A special use case was also implemented in the developed platform in which the detection
cycle would run in parallel with a previously configured MapReduce job. If this task could be
performed without hurting the detection time and efficiency of Snort it would mean that the de-
ployed computer cluster could also be used for other user chosen MapReduce jobs, and not be
made specially for Snort, therefore giving the option to anyone using this proposed platform for
also using the cluster as they see fit for their own benefit, while also using Snort to its full extent,
finding out if their services are being targeted by any attacker.
The Hunter is made of several very different scripts, written in bash, Ansible, Java and Python.
But there are two special ones that join everything together and are key for the correct function
of the platform. This are The Packet Hunter, in charge of the distributing of Snort’s processing
and the detection cycle, and The Capturer, that captures traffic in special ways, and they were both
developed in Python.
A screen shot of The Hunter folder was done and, with all its contents, is presented on fig-
ure 3.1 where it is possible to see the main script The Packet Hunter along with other directories.
It is good to note that all Ansible playbooks and scripts, along with Snort configuration files and
rules used are located on playbooks folder. The Capturer script has to work on a different directory
of The Packet Hunter and, as such, is located on the folder capturer. There is also a classification
directory which has the java code for the chosen MapReduce job. There are also present both old
directories, where are saved the already processed alert files and results from running MapReduce.
In this chapter will firstly be presented the initial setup necessary to run The Hunter. There
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Figure 3.1: The Hunter folder and its constitution
are also some thoughts given to nuances and problems that originated with The Capturer on sec-
tion 3.2. Up next, in section 3.3, is a detailed explanation of The Packet Hunter with use cases
and the algorithm for this python script. On section 3.4 is given some attention to smaller, but
nonetheless important scripts. Finally a quick overview of this chapter and closing remarks are
presented in section 3.5.
3.1 Initial Setup
Before presenting the most important scripts that are part of this hunter tool, it is mandatory to
give information about initial required setup. Because a distribution of Snort processing is going
to be made, a computer cluster is always necessary. Openstack was used to deploy clusters easily,
with already configured Secure Shell (SSH). The deployed clusters are composed by a Master and
a certain number of Workers, and all of them are actually deployed virtual machines. One problem
with this setup is that the cluster can be easily taken down with all data that was stored being lost,
for instance if there is a power cut. After that Snort needed to be installed and configured on every
Worker of the cluster.
Ansible was a big part of this project as it helped distribute commands and scripts simultane-
ously to the cluster, sometimes it was even used just to run commands and scripts on the Master.
This means that Ansible has to be installed and properly configured on the host where The Hunter
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folder is downloaded to. This Hunter folder has inside it all scripts that make this autonomous
and scalable platform possible. From this point on, the computer that has this folder will be called
the Starting Host in order to prevent confusion with the Workers in the Cluster and the Master.
Installing Ansible is simple, one can do it from any package manager, and for the configuration
it is only necessary to edit the file host inside Ansible directory and include the group workers,
containing the IP address of all the workers in the cluster, and the group master, with the proper
IP address. For security purposes Ansible should be configured with SSH keys, not passwords,
and The Hunter only works with that setup. Again, if using OpenStack it is possible to configure
all computers in the cluster with SSH and download the corresponding key file to the Starting
Host. Obviously the Starting Host has to have a connection to the created cluster and a 1000Mb/s
connection is recommended. If using less, the transfer of files between the Starting Host and the
Workers will take much more time and will become a bottleneck for the platform.
The Packet Hunter and The Capturer scripts are both written in python, therefore it is also
necessary for python to be installed on the Starting Host. The used python version was 2.7.10.
This Starting Host also has to have a Linux distribution, due to the configured commands on most
scripts developed being exclusive to Linux.
One of the use cases for testing the developed tool involved starting a MapReduce task at the
same time of Snort’s processing to access to workload on the computers. For this purpose Hadoop
and it’s core modules, like HDFS and MapReduce need to be properly configured on the cluster.
If using OpenStack this is automatically done.
3.2 The Capturer
The Capturer is the python script in charge of capturing, storing and sending the traffic to the
Starting Host, where The Packet Hunter is working. This script is always capturing traffic in
cycles, with each cycle having a certain time interval that is chosen by the user. It is important to
note that this script is not essential for the execution of The Packet Hunter, but it helps in the way
of periodically bringing pcaps to be analyzed by the main script (explained further in section 3.3).
Even though using The Capturer is not mandatory, because any user of this developed tool can
capture traffic as he/she may seem fit, it was used in every test made in this dissertation thesis so it
is only right to give some information about how it works. It also has some nuances and challenges
that are going to be discussed further in this sub chapter.
The first important step is to explain what arguments this script is expecting and how they
change its performance. Firstly it is necessary to tell the program if it is going to run in a local
configuration or a remote one, and this step happens so The Capturer knows where to send the
packet capture, when they are ready, and it will always send to the working directory of The
Packet Hunter on the Starting Host. Usually, for testing purposes, both scripts (The Packet Hunter
and The Capturer) are working in the same computer, therefore the local configuration is used.
But if one needs to capture in one specific machine in the network and The Packet Hunter is
working on a different computer, then the remote configuration is necessary (and previously setup
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SSH connection). In this program one can do this by passing the argument “remote” or “local”
followed by the location of where the captured pcap is to be sent. The only thing left to tell the
script is, obviously, for how much time it will run each capture cycle. This is done in minutes.
Just to exemplify for a local configuration with a 30 minute capture cycle one can start The
Capturer with the command “sudo python TheCapturer.py local /home/mike/Documents/ 30”,
where /home/mike/Documents/ is the location where The Packet Hunter is working. In the previ-
ous example, both scripts are working on the Starting Host. On the other hand, if one uses the com-
mand “sudo python TheCapturer.py remote ubuntu@192.168.109.228:/home/mike/Documents/
30” this will put the script in remote configuration and use the IP address and user to copy the
pcap to the remote directory specified, that is were the Starting Host is working.
Upon executing the script, and after the arguments have been correctly parsed, the traffic on a
specific interface is now being captured with tcpdump for indefinite cycles, with each cycle taking
a certain amount of user specified time and ending when a terminal signal is received (in the form
of ctr+c). Immediately after ending a cycle, another one begins so that no packet is lost. There is
also a thread that starts in charge of sending the previously recorded pcap to its final destination,
whether that may be with just a move command (local configuration) or with a secure copy (remote
configuration). A success file is also sent to the working directory of The Packet Hunter telling it
that a processing cycle can now take place. If the user terminates The Capturer in order to stop it
from recording the internet packets, the program will finish the capturing cycle it is on, and after
sending the pcap and success file, it will also send a end of capturing file so that The Packet Hunter
knows that no pcaps are to be expected after the one just sent.
One of the big problems faced here was that the file that results from a capturing cycle is,
eventually, going to be sent over the network while there is another capturing cycle going on.
Whether the previously captured pcap file is now sent to another PC with secure copy (with remote
configuration), or later when the script The Packet Hunter decides to distribute the file (when
running local configuration) this transfer is going to be captured by tcpdump because it is always
running in cycles. Therefore the problem of, with each cycle, getting pcaps with bigger and bigger
size arose. The solution found to this problem was to apply a filter to tcpdump in order to prevent
the capture of any packets between the host machine and the cluster computers (which are deemed
safe) or between the host and the machine where The Packet Hunter is running. For instance if
the command “tcpdump -i eth0 not host 192.168.109.10” is used, all communication between the
machine running tcpdump and the host with IP address 192.168.109.10 will not be captured.
In figure 3.2 is presented the code responsible for executing the tcpdump command, when
dealing with local configuration. In this case it is important to ignore the packets exchanged with
all the cluster computers. It is also good to note that, when starting tcpdump with sudo privileges
the linux operating system actually starts two processes. In order to stop the capture once the user
defined time has expired the spawned processes are grouped together and killed together.
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Figure 3.2: Making the TCPDump command on The Capturer
3.3 The Packet Hunter
The Packet Hunter is the most important script developed in this thesis. It joins together other
scripts for the common goal of distributing the Snort processing through all the computer workers
in the cluster, and even gathers the results obtained in the form of alerts to the Starting Host.
The algorithm for The Packet Hunter can be seen in figure 3.3. In a simple way, when the
Starting Host executes this script, there are some configurations and setup that take place on the
Workers and the Master. After that, The Packet Hunter enters in a detection cycle in which it
waits for a packet capture file, divides it in equally sized parts according to the number of Workers
the cluster has, sends each part of the original pcap to each worker and then runs Snort from
the workers, in a parallel way to analyze the previously copied pcaps. The only thing left in the
detection cycle is to analyze the alerts produced by Snort and reset some changes that were done
during this cycle.
The problem that is approached is that, when running Snort with a significant amount of rules
from a single host the processing time of a certain capture is significantly slowed down. It is even
worse if Snort is working in real time, and it gets unbearable if there is also a capture of traffic
taking place, many packets are dropped and not processed. Even Snort acknowledges this and that
is why they comment out most rules they give to their users by default, defending a “Connectivity
over Security” policy when using Snort in real time, for most users [27].
When using this tool, however, the Snort processing is distributed to several computers with
the policy “Security over Connectivity”, supposedly allowing an overall faster processing whilst
also maintaining a good efficiency, which is what we are trying to prove. The downside is that the
real time intrusion detection is lost, and instead a delayed one is done.
In section 3.3.1 is explained the most important functions that are taking place when using
The Packet Hunter with the sole purpose of distributing Snort workload. A special use case is also
detailed in section 3.3.2, in which the pcap that The Packet Hunter receives is also sent to HDFS
and a MapReduce function is executed at the same time of Snort processing.
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Figure 3.3: The Packet Hunter Algorithm
3.3.1 Normal Use
This python script has three distinct steps. The initial set up for the master and the workers in the
cluster, the waiting for a packet capture to process and the processing itself.
The initial setup starts as soon as the script is executed. It needs sudo privileges and one can
use the command “sudo python ThePacketHunter.py 0” on a Linux terminal to start the program.
The only input the user needs to make is the first argument passed and it can be a “0”, “1” or “2”.
With a “0” the program will only process the pcap with Snort. On the other hand, with a “1” it will
only process the pcap with a MapReduce job. The final option “2” will do both tasks. Upon doing
this, the script will attempt to reach the ip address of the workers and copy to each one a Java
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program that is in charge of running a terminal command in order to starting Snort IDS and return
some statistics on processing time . A connection to the master of the cluster is also attempted and,
if successful, the jar file that contains the MapReduce Classification function, based on Parallel
Packet Processor [28], is transferred. After this the connection to all computers in the cluster is
confirmed, and everything is set up for the next scripts steps.
At this point the detection cycle has started. The first thing that marks this cycle is the waiting
until a success file is found in the working directory. This file, that can be sent over by The
Capturer script, has in it written the number of seconds the capture of internet traffic took, and it
symbolizes that the pcap to be processed is now ready and located in the Starting Host, where The
Packet Hunter was executed. This means that the cycle can continue and next it will now take the
full capture and divide it equally in size for as many workers there are in the cluster. This is done
thanks to tcpdump -C flag that can write a capture while keeping it under a user specified amount
of bytes. The corresponding python code in charge of calculating the amount of bytes for the -C
flag and the execution of the tcpdump command can be seen in figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: The Packet Hunter function for dividing the pcap
With the pcap divided it is time to send each piece to each worker. This is done with secure
copy, without any threading. This can mean that, with a 1000Mb/s connection, the transfer rate
of each individual piece of pcap to a computer in the same LAN can achieve values as high as
70MB/s. If threading was implemented, even though the transfer of all pcap pieces could be
faster, the high transfer rate will diminish according to how many threads are used and if many
threads are started at the same time the computer running the script can be slowed down.
The next step of the detection cycle is to start Snort on each worker to process the previously
copied pcap piece. This is where Ansible comes in. The ability to easily start different operations,
with a certain order, in distinct computers is the key to distribute the processing of Snort through
the cluster’s workers in this developed platform. The Ansible playbook used in this stage is con-
figured to run on the workers only, and has the task of running Snort, outputting the processing
time and fetching the produced alerts to the Starting Host where The Packet Hunter is working.
This and other Ansible playbooks will be detailed further in section 3.4.
Finally, the cycle is almost over and the most intensive processing is done. What happens next
is a small convenience for the user in which the previously fetched alerts are reduced and their
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content is summarized on screen. This alerts are also saved on a special folder with a timestamp in
order to facilitate future access for the user. An Ansible playbook is also used for cleanup purposes
in the end of each cycle, for instance deleting the parts of the pcap of each worker and resetting
the alert file so that no alerts are repeated. Now, the program will either wait for another success
file in order to repeat this cycle, but on a new packet capture, or end all processing if a final cycle
file is found in the working directory, which can be sent over by The Hunt Begins program. Some
time statistics are also printed at the end of each detection cycle.
3.3.2 Use With MapReduce
In this use case The Packet Hunter program was modified in order to work with Hadoop core
modules: HDFS and MapReduce. This was done with the intent of studying if running MapRe-
duce jobs in the cluster will affect in any way the Snort processing of packets, when running
simultaneously, and how much more time was spent doing this new operations.
A packet classification program, based on Parallel Packet Processor, and developed by MIEIC
students at FEUP, was used (* expandir).
As for the python program itself, there were two additions made, that would only happen if
the user, when starting the script, would pass the argument “1” or “2”. The first addition was
implemented as soon as the detection cycle began: the WebHDFS REST Application Program-
ming Interface (API) was used with the objective of uploading the complete pcap to HDFS. This
makes the stored packet capture available for future reference and also allows the execution of
MapReduce jobs on the uploaded file. It is important to note that this operation will, probably, be
a bottleneck for the script and consume some detection cycle time, when compared to other steps
of this cycle, but we felt that this was, overall, a necessary step in studying the proposed program.
This upload happens right before the secure transfer of the capture pieces to each worker. No
threading is involved in this step.
Figure 3.5: The Packet Hunter functions for uploading to HDFS and starting MapReduce
There was also added a new Ansible playbook for starting the MapReduce job in the master.
Even though this is only working in one host, it is simple and effective which justifies the use.
This playbook starts at the same time as the Snort processing and it essentially does two things. It
sends the Hadoop command in order to start the MapReduce jobs on the previously uploaded pcap
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and then, when the jobs are over, it fetches the results from the hadoop logs located on HDFS all
the way to the computer executing The Packet Hunter script.
The python functions responsible for the upload to HDFS and the start of the Ansible playbook
that starts the MapReduce operations can be seen in figure 3.5. The REST API for HDFS can be
accessed through the port 50070 on the IP address of the computer Master. A curl command was
put together to connect to this port and IP with the intend of uploading the file, using the operation
create of the API and, in this case, the user ’ubuntu’, coded in function copyToHDFS . Because
the program is running in cycles, the Ansible playbook that executes the hadoop command on the
master for starting the MapReduce jobs has to be changed each cycle with the new pcap name.
This and the terminal command for starting the playbook are part of the function startMapReduce.
3.4 Other Scripts
There are several other scripts, written in Java, Ansible and even bash, that are needed for the
correct behavior of this tool. Some of them run only once, on cluster setup for instance, and others
run every single detection cycle. The most important ones will be highlighted next and briefly
explained.
A set of scripts were made in bash to deploy and configure Snort in the workers of the cluster
started by OpenStack. These scripts would install all dependencies for Snort, like package bison
and flex, and download and install the latest versions of libpcap from tcpdump webpage, and also
daq and Snort from Snort’s main page. All these three downloads are a must if Snort is to properly
work. After the successful installation of Snort, it was also needed to configure some options
and create some directories. Automating this task was a necessity because of how often it was
necessary to restart the cluster. To run both configuration scripts in a newly created cluster, a
Ansible playbook was also put together.
Because java is installed in all computers, they supported Hadoop after all, it was developed a
simple java program, with just a few classes, in order to run Snort, gather the normal output from
the console terminal, and from there extract the processing time by searching for the sentence
“Run time for packet processing was ” and print this information. Again, Ansible was used to
distribute the execution of this java program through the cluster and also fetch any resulting alerts
that could be produced by Snort.
There are some Ansible playbooks that were used during this dissertation thesis that are in-
cluded in The Hunter even though they are not used in any way during the execution of The Packet
Hunter and The Capturer. One of this scripts changes the Snort rules and configuration file on all
Workers, which can be useful for the user if there is a need to add or remove certain rules.
There is a need to edit configurations on specific scripts, like the IP address of the workers, or
the directory where the SSH keys are located, but this is all detailed on read me files in each folder
so any user can quickly adapt the tool to his working environment.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter the platform developed was introduced. The architecture of The Hunter folder
was presented and the algorithm for The Packet Hunter, the most important script in the tool, was
explained. This was all done with the intent of tackling the problems that results from running
Snort in a single machine. This problems can vary between slow performance of the computer
used and the lack of intrusion detection by Snort. With the distribution of the processing, using
Ansible, we are able to load as many rules as possible into Snort so it has better chances in finding
most different types of attacks. This, obviously, can lead to more false positives in the alerts and
the detection done is now a delayed one, therefore it is up to the user to understand what went
wrong after the attacks have already happened, or are still happening.
Chapter 4
Cyber Attacks And How Easy They Are
Snort, one of the best and most used intrusion detection system, is the main focus of this disserta-
tion thesis. As such, this strong capacity for detecting attacks needs to be tested in our distributed
Snort solution, presented in chapter 3, in order to prove its worth.
Snort makes use of signatures for detection, and this are written in Snort’s many rules files.
It was important to test, to a degree, Snort’s efficiency in detecting intrusions when applying this
rules to individual small pieces of the same pcap, because that is just what The Packet Hunter
does. A comparison between this scenario and when processing the entire pcap in on machine is
made in chapter 5.
There are many intrusions that can be practiced, and many different cyber attacks that can
be made. In this work, due to the available time, it was not possible to perform an extended
and exhaustive penetration testing. Instead just two types of attack were taken into account. The
chosen types had to be a) significant and important nowadays, and b) easy to understand and
replicate. This important requisites helped narrow down the search to Structured Query Language
(SQL) injection and DOS attacks.
In section 4.1 will be explained what makes a SQL injection attack and how to exploit this
vulnerability and in section 4.2 Denial of Service attacks are detailed and demonstrated.
4.1 SQL Injection
According to OWASP top 10 the single most dangerous and common attack is command injec-
tion[29], for example SQL injection. This type of injection happens when the user input is not
properly escaped, sending untrusted data to an interpreter, and if this vulnerability is encountered
it is relatively easy to exploit, due to a large amount of examples available online and automated
tools like sqlmap [30], and when successfully exploited the impact is extremely severe: most
things from the database can be dumped by the attacker.
The idea behind an SQL injection is simple: one tries to escape out of the original programed
query and somehow replace or change it with a new one. For instance if there is a website that
shows information about a movie the user searches, the query is going to look something like this:
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“SELECT * From Movies Where MovieName = userInput” . If one searches for the movie The
Deer Hunter the query should now be “SELECT * From Movies Where MovieName = The Deer
Hunter” and the server would return all information it has available about this amazing movie. An
attacker could also type in “The Deer Hunter OR 1=1”, therefore creating the equally valid query
“SELECT * From Movies Where MovieName = The Deer Hunter OR 1=1” which is always true
and returns all rows from database Movies.
There are many types of SQL injection, but the concept in all of them is always the same.
In this dissertation thesis was used a web server provided by itsecgames called bWAPP, or an
extremely buggy web app, and this is a PHP application with a MySQL database made specially
for free usage to anyone trying to improve their own pentester skills [31]. There is also available a
custom Linux virtual machine, called bee-box, that already has bWAPP installed and configured.
For practice purposes and packet capturing bee-box was virtualized with VirtualBox, therefore
providing more than a hundred vulnerabilities to be explored, including many different variations
of SQL injection.
It was important to chose conceptually different SQL injection attacks to perform in order to
test Snort in different ways, which lead to the exploit of six bWAPP levels, which will be detailed
next.
4.1.1 Hacking GET/Search and POST/Search
Firstly search boxes were attacked, with both Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) GET and POST
requests. On bWAPP both attacks can be found on the page sqli_1.php and sqli_6.php respectively.
One important difference between GET and POST is that the SQL query goes in the Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) with GET request, but with POST requests the query is part of the body
of the HTTP message. Even though the payload of the attack is located in different places of the
HTTP message, the attack vector is equal for both situations.
Exploiting this search boxes was not a difficult task. If one tries to search anything followed by
a single quote, the server will answer back with a SQL syntax error, demonstrated in figure 4.1a.
A very common route was then taken, in which the union operator was used. This operator is
responsible for combining the results of several select statements, working only if each one used
has the same number of columns. With that knowledge the payload “Hulk’ union all select 1– ”
results in a syntax error with the meaning that the number of columns for the two select queries are
different. It is only a matter of incrementing this number to find out that the query “Hulk’ union
all select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7– ” produces no syntax errors, shown in figure 4.1b.
From this point on, it is just a matter of choosing what to ask the database. For instance, the
payload “-1’ union all select 1,version(),3,4,database(),6,7– ” will output the MySQL version in-
stalled and the name of the database. It is also possible to get the names of all columns in all tables
by accessing the metadata table information_schema. Using the attack vector “-1’ union select
all 1,column_name,3,table_name,6,7,8 FROM information_schema.columns;– ” will produce this
result. The previous attack allows us to know the name of the table where the user information is
stored and the columns that make that table. Therefore the trivial dump of the login and password
4.1 SQL Injection 27
(a) Quote syntax error.
(b) Finding the number of columns for Union query.
(c) Getting passwords and logins!
Figure 4.1: Learning SQL injection behaviour and exploits
of all users with “-1’ union select all 1,concat(login,’:’,password),3,4,6,7,8 FROM users;– “ is
possible, which can be seen if figure 4.1c.
4.1.2 Hacking GET/Select and POST/Select
Select boxes were also victims of exploits, and just like with search, both GET and POST request
were attacked. The attacks can be visited in bWAPP page sqli_2.php for GET and sqli_13.php for
POST.
This time around the payload is still the same for both levels but the way of sending the attack
is now very different. Because one can only select a movie between the ten choices available
and then press the Go button to submit the request, it is not possible to insert here any attack
vector. Luckily, when dealing with GET requests, the payload can simply be injected on the URL
itself. With POST this can not be done and a way to change the body of this HTTP message, after
submitting it, was needed. This was accomplished with the Firefox add-on Tamper Data, that acts
like a proxy between the computer and the server, and allows the user to change any data that was
already submitted.
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Figure 4.2: Bypassing login form.
The exploits used were almost exactly equal to the ones described on section 4.1.1, with the
only difference being that there was no initial quote needed to escape the query. For instance, to
dump the login and passwords the payload “-1 union select all 1, concat(login,’:’,password),3,4,6,7,8
FROM users;– ” can be used.
4.1.3 Bypassing Login Form
The act of requiring a login and password before accessing some websites has always been used
to prevent unauthorized access to private files and to protect users privacy. They are the very first
security measure implemented in websites and services that need some kind of privacy. Because of
this, the whole act of logging in has been victim to much penetration testing, and the consequences
in bypassing authentication can be disastrous.
Testing the login forms for SQL injection is just one of the many vulnerabilities that can be
found in authentication. In bWAPP a weakly implemented login form can be found by accessing
page sqli_3.php and the objective of this level is to use SQL injection to change the query that
validates the user and password inputted, in order to get authenticated by the server.
Exploiting this vulnerability was relatively easy, just a matter of understanding what the login
query looks like in the server, and then send malicious input to alter its expected behavior. In
this case, if a user sends his login and password the query is going to be something like “Select *
FROM users WHERE login=’mike’ AND password=’12345’ ”. If a bad intentioned user escapes
out of the query with a quote he can bypass this authentication by writing in the password box
the attack vector “ ‘ or 1=1– ”. This will ultimately transform the query to “Select * FROM users
WHERE login=’hacker’ AND password=’ ’ or 1=1– ”. The attack vector changed the query to
one that will always be true and results in the bypass of authentication. In figure 4.2 is shown this
exact inputs on the login form and it is possible to see that the hacker gets authenticated as the
user Neo.
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4.1.4 Experiments with Boolean Blind SQL injection
Blind SQL injection is a special type of vulnerability, much more time consuming to exploit than
other code injections, that usually is encountered in web pages of servers that are not configured
to output the data that was queried but instead show already configured messages. The injection
itself is very similar to the cases seen in previous sections, the real problem is obtaining the results
of the attacks. One of the ways this can be done is with true or false questions. If the database
outputs absolutely nothing about the query one can try time based blind injection, which translates
in telling the database to wait a certain period of time if the attack vector is true, or the opposite
if it is false. If there are some different generic messages it is possible to use boolean based blind
injection to study if the attack vector is true or not according to the message shown.
Only boolean based SQL injection was exploited, and the bWAPP page for this vulnerability
can be found when accessing sqli_4.php. This web page is made of a search box that tells the
user if the searched movie is available on the database. If the movie Goodfellas is searched the
page will return “The movie does not exist in our database!”. In the other hand, if Iron Man is
queried the page now tells that this movie can be found with the response “The movie exists in our
database!”. This difference in responses is the key to exploit this vulnerability.
The escaping out of the original query is the same as that of previous sections, a simple quote
does the trick. To confirm SQL injection one can type “iron man ’ and 1=1– ” and expect a true
response from the database, which happens. The only thing left is to confirm a negative answer:
the query “iron man ’ and 1=2– ” produces a false response.
From this point on it is just a matter of choosing what questions to ask the database. Usually
this type of exploit is done with the help of automated tools. In this case only a few queries were
made so there was no need to use sqlmap or to develop a script for this purpose. It was decided
to find out what was the database name. With this in mind, first the number of characters in the
name had to be found. If the query “iron man ’ and length(database())=1– ” is performed, the
web page answers false. A simple incrementation of the number of characters leads to a positive
answer when the size is five. Next the query “iron man’ and substring(database(),1,1)=’a’– “ can
be made to test if the first character is an "a". Again, when iterating this value the database reveals
that the first letter of the database is a "b". By doing this process with all five characters the name
of the database is revealed to be “bWAPP”. This is a time consuming attack, and one should write
a script for more advanced queries.
4.2 Denial of Service
Besides SQL injection, Denial of Service attacks were also used to test our solution. Most DOS
attacks leave behind a large amount of evidence in the form of a spike in traffic, which is very
useful for testing this specific program because it increases the size of the pcap captured while
also allowing a stress test on Hadoop and Snort.
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A denial of service occurs when a certain service, server or machine is made temporarily
unavailable to its users. This can occur in very different ways and in distinct layers of the OSI
model. Usually there are specific ways to protect against these attacks, but because there are
so many types of DOS it is also close to impossible for a user to be completely safe. Even big
corporations like Microsoft and Sony can have some of their services temporarily taken down by
Distributed Denial of Service. The response and total prevention is very difficult because of the
hard task in distinguishing a legitimate user from a harmful one.
The bWAPP bee-box server was used as a target to some DOS attacks. All of these attacks
were launched from one or more Linux running machines and are going to be detailed next.
One of the simplest DOS attacks to start is a ping flood. It is a layer 3 attack that works
if the attacker has access to more bandwidth than the victim. This can also be upgraded to a
distributed denial of service if several computers attack the same server. In scenario the objective
is just sending lots of very big ICMP packets as fast as possible. If successful, and no protection
encountered, the victim will be flooded with a vast amount of packets and forced to drop some
of them, therefore the legitimate traffic the user is making can be completely dropped. Using this
attack requires sudo privileges and the simple command “sudo ping victim.com -f -s 65507” . The
f flag tells ping to send packets with a zero time interval while taking advantage of the size flag set
to 65507 bytes, that coupled with the overhead of the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
request reaches the maximum IP packet size of 65535 bytes.
Going into OSI layer 4, the Transport Layer, it is possible to exploit the TCP handshake into
causing a very dangerous DOS: the SYN flood, whose main objective is to bind all resources
of the server preventing it to create TCP sessions with legitimate users. In normal operations, a
TCP session is established after the three way handshake is finished. This handshake starts with
the client trying to synchronize with the server, sending a TCP SYN packet. The server answers
this with a TCP SYN-ACK and after that it waits for the final acknowledge from the client, a
TCP ACK, shown in figure 4.3a. Only after this three steps is the session established for the
TCP communication. In SYN flood DOS attack the objective is to start the handshake with the
server but never actually finish it with the final acknowledgment, as is illustrated in figure 4.3b.
In this way, the server remains with allocated resources for this communication that will never,
theoretically, end. This attack was simulated with Low Orbit Ion Cannon, a free program with a
simple user interface that can easily start SYN flooding any target [32].
At the application layer, there are several different DOS attacks that are getting more dangerous
nowadays, while also not using too much bandwidth. For instance, slowloris is a python program
that can exhaust the available connection of certain web servers, like Apache, without consuming
much bandwidth [34]. It does this by opening several connections to the target with partial requests
and holding them open for as long as possible, without actually finishing these requests. In this
way the victim will allocate most of its available connections to slowloris, and when the concurrent
connection pool is filled it will ultimately deny access to legitimate users.
Still in layer 7 attacks, there is a variation of slowloris that was also used in this dissertation
thesis. Slowhttptest, like the name suggests, is a tool for testing your web servers against applica-
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(a) Normal behavior
(b) Exploiting SYN vulnerability
Figure 4.3: TCP Handshake [33]
tion level denial of service attack [35]. This tool, obtainable through most package managers, can
start an HTTP POST DOS attack. This particular attack does not make use of partial requests. In-
stead it sends a completely legitimate request to the target server but it changes the Content Length
field of the HTTP header to represent the size of the body message that follows. The program then
proceeds to send the rest of the message but at an incredible slow rate. The target, seeing a valid
request, will wait for the entire message to arrive and because of that will be slowed down. With
slowhttptest one can define the number of connections per second, the timeout between follow up
data and the Content Length field. For instance the following terminal line will shut down any
simple unprotected Apache server, like our bWAPP: “slowhttptest -c 1000 -B -g -o my_body_stats
-i 110 -r 200 -s 8192 -t FAKEVERB -u http://192.168.109.216/bWAPP/sm_dos_1.php”. From the
statistics shown in figure 4.4 it only takes nine seconds for the service to be completely unavail-
able.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter was presented some different approaches for practicing two very important, com-
mon and recent types of cyber attacks that target a web server. If a web developer is not conscious
about cyber attacks their web page can be a paradise to hackers, and exploiting SQL injections
and performing DOS attacks is easy against vulnerable targets. For any web developer it is highly
advised to properly escape any user input and, if the website reaches a large scale of users and
accesses, one should consider to purchase some kind of DOS protection.
Detecting this attacks with our developed solution is a good step to validate its accuracy. SQL
Injections can be very dangerous and go unnoticed in the middle of all capture traffic, because
they only leave behind few traces in the form of HTTP requests that were made. Denial of Service
32 Cyber Attacks And How Easy They Are
Figure 4.4: Results from slow HTTP DOS
tend to be the other way around, it is easy to notice when under attack, and usually there is large
amount of traffic to be studied in the pcap capture. This are two ideal scenarios in which The
Packet Hunter was tested, and for capturing the traffic that was used to create all results presented
in chapter 5, all these attacks were made.
Chapter 5
Results
With all scripts written, every computer in the cluster setup with all configurations edited, and
with cyber attacks ready to be made it was time to test the behavior of The Hunter. In this chapter
all results obtained from different evaluations performed will be presented and explained and the
methods detailed.
In section 5.1 the testbed in which all measurements were done is given and all common details
to all experiments are explained. The developed solution was tested in three distinct ways. The
first one was when no attacks were performed (section 5.3), when the packet capture had SQL
injection attacks (section 5.4) and finally when DOS were started (section 5.5).
In section 5.8 is presented some conclusions to the tests done and a short round up of the
information given along this entire chapter.
5.1 Testbed
This thesis was developed in a FEUP laboratory for networking and computers. This lab, called
NetLab, has three different areas. One area has six stands available for students courses and each
one of these stands is composed by one Cisco 2900 series router, one Cisco Catalyst 3560 switch
and four computers connected to the switch. Another area is made of ten computers in a private
network that are used exclusively for making clusters with OpenStack. Finally there is an area
for the development of thesis with different computers, Wi-Fi routers and Nortel switches. The
network topology can be seen in figure 5.1.
OpenStack’s capability of quickly setting up a computer cluster with Hadoop and a good SSH
configuration was used because firstly it was already installed and working well, and secondly we
wanted to start MapReduce jobs at the same time of Snort processing, therefore needing a cluster
that was capable of running Snort while also having Hadoop configured. The computers used
had 4GB RAM with an Intel Duo P9 Penryn. They were virtualized for the full amount of RAM
available.
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Figure 5.1: Network topology at Netlab
The Starting Host was always the same computer for all experiments, a Toshiba Satellite,
which had 8GB RAM with an Intel i7 4510u processor with two cores and a base frequency of
2GHz.
Snort’s version 3.0 is the newest stable release, at the time of writing, and was the one used.
As for Snort’s rules the version downloaded and configured was the 2976 snapshot, and they can
be downloaded by anyone as long as an account is created on Snort’s web page, which is free.
Like was explained before, most of this rules are commented by default so users deploying the
usual configuration don’t get many false positives and slow performance. For our purpose all rules
were used and, when testing if Snort is correctly configured, a total of 22111 rules are loaded into
Snort for detection, demonstrated on figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Total detection rules loaded into Snort
For getting consistent results, there was a need to change the least amount of variables between
tests. For that reason, and if not specified in the tests performed, the cluster used always had one
Master and three Workers, and The Capturer was executed with a 15 minutes cycle interval. The
Starting Host was always the same, with a 1000Mb/s connection to the cluster’s machines, and The
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Capturer was configured in local configuration for all tests. The Starting Host also had bWAPP
running in VirtualBox with a bridge adapter configuration, and there was programed a simple
python program to access several web pages from bWAPP, and it was executed in four different
computers to create random legitimate traffic to the web server.
A special packet capture, referenced from now on as base pcap, was also used in conjunc-
tion with the captured traffic on each test. This pcap had 1.8GB size and was captured in two
hour interval, using different types of traffic like email, SSH, several web pages and forums and
downloads. This base pcap served as a way to ensure the developed platform could handle more
traffic than the amount that was captured in the principal tests performed. Also most users that will
eventually use this proposed solution will have more than 891 MB captured in under 15 minutes.
5.2 Metrics to Evaluate and Tests to be Performed
In this section a quick overhaul of what tests were made to evaluate The Hunter’s performance are
given and the metrics used to assess and compare the results are explained.
When using The Packet Hunter, the script outputs several different time measures. It shows
how much time was spent dividing the pcap, using secure copy to transfer the pcap, the time it
took to upload the file to HDFS (if used), the total time consumed by the Ansible playbook that
distributes Snort’s workload and the Snort processing time. It is important to note that the Snort
processing time is actually given by Snort itself, while all other times are calculated by the python
script. Also, the Ansible playbook that was timed, the one that starts Snort, englobes the time for
Snort loading rules, preprocessors and running time, and also fetching the alerts. When testing
The Packet Hunter along side with MapReduce jobs, it was also retrieved the time spent in this
step through the web interface that is made available by OpenStack.
The alerts produced in each run of The Packet Hunter are saved and their content is summa-
rized. A comparison between the false and true positives, and accuracy, between the different tests
performed is also performed.
There were three very different captures performed, and each of them was processed for intru-
sions with The Packet Hunter. The first case scenario happened with normal traffic. In the second
SQL injection exploits were practiced against the bWAPP server and the traffic captured. Finally
DOS attacks were made. This resulted in three different pcaps captured in a 15 minute time.
To compare the results obtained with the developed platform, each different scenario was also
tested for the state of the art solution (Snort running in only one machine) and when MapReduce
jobs were added to the cluster’s workload.
5.3 Traffic with no Attacks
The first scenario used to test The Packet Hunter involved no cyber attacks. The objective was to
have a consistent set of results to use when comparing with the other obtained results from using
attacks, and also to have an idea of the normal behavior of the developed platform. Three different
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Figure 5.3: Results obtained with legitimate traffic
tests were done in this scenario: one for the State of the Art solution that is Snort running in a
single machine. The second test is with the normal execution of The Packet Hunter and the third
corresponds to the special use of The Packet Hunter with MapReduce. For each one of this three
tests 10 detection cycles were done to establish a confidence interval. Because using The Capturer
and analysing different pcaps in each of the 10 detection cycles could lead to uncertain values, the
same packet capture was used in all repetitions.
A traffic capture was made in 15 minutes using The Capturer in local configuration. In order to
maintain consistency between this packet capture and the ones that will be made for SQL injection
and DOS scenarios it was tried to have the same traffic going through the computer in all captures.
This traffic can be categorized as a youtube stream, a twitch stream, facebook and linkedin opened,
several email clients and a download of a pdf file and a small iso file. Constant legitimate requests
to the bWAPP web server were also being done. This lead to a 891 MB pcap.
In order to bring more packets for Snort to analyze the base pcap was also used in conjunction
with the captured one, so, with both pcaps a total of 2.691 GB worth of traffic were processed
for intrusions in this scenario, when no attacks were done. The results obtained from all three
solutions can be seen in figure 5.3, where there is also represented the confidence interval based
on a normal distribution with 95% confidence. The times represented are the Snort processing
time and the total time to run Ansible playbook and they are the average from all repetitions.
Obviously the later is always longer than the former. Because the Snort processing time obtained
in both Packet Hunter solutions are from the three Workers, there are actually 30 instances of this
value for each one of these tests, so in this cases the confidence interval has this 30 values.
For a better understanding of all time values, the table 5.1 has represented the highest and
lowest obtained time value for all repetitions of The Packet Hunter in its default mode, including
the division and transfer time of the pcap, which were not represented on figure 5.3. One can
notice that the time for dividing the capture and send it through the network are very similar and
constant. Also the total time that took to process 2.691 GB pcap file with no intrusions with the
developed platform was less than the 15 minute capture, which allows the system to be ready for
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Table 5.1: Time variations in The Packet Hunter for legitimate traffic
Minimum time (s) Maximum time (s)
Division 47.9 54.4
Secure Copy 42.7 54.7
Snort Processing 75.1 96.3
Ansible Playbook 159.8 193.2
Total Cycle Time 252.0 272.2
processing the next batch of internet traffic.
When using the State of the Art solution, Snort running only in one machine, 29 different rules
were triggered with a total of 1642 alerts produced. All of this is false positives as no attacks were
done in this step. This is somehow to be expected as there are a large amount of rules loaded into
Snort. When using The Packet Hunter in its default mode 17 different rules were detected with
a total amount of 1631 alerts written. There is an obvious loss of amount of alerts produced and
rules triggered when using The Packet Hunter, even though they are all false positives.
5.4 Traffic with SQL Injection Attacks
In this scenario the SQL Injection attacks that were detailed and experimented on section 4.1 were
performed against bWAPP server and the traffic was collected with The Capturer for 15 minutes.
It was expected that the results obtained here were similar to the ones in section 5.3, because the
attacks performed did not leave a huge trace on the traffic captured. The pcap obtained had 927.5
MB and, when used with base pcap a total of 2.73 GB of traffic were processed by The Packet
Hunter.
In this scenario the same tests were performed, with 10 repetitions in each one. In figure 5.4 is
presented the results obtained in these three different experiments. Again the same times are used:
Snort’s processing time and the time to run the Ansible playbook. Also shown in the same figure
is a confidence interval of 95% for every test performed.
In table 5.2 is presented the minimum and maximum time in all recorded times obtained in
the ten runs of The Packet Hunter. Just like with legitimate traffic, the values are very similar and
there is no big discrepancy between them. which was expected. It is good to note that all cycle
iterations finished before the 15 minute mark, so the script was ready for the next pcap.
Table 5.2: Time variations in The Packet Hunter for SQL Injection traffic
Minimum time (s) Maximum time (s)
Division 48.2 58.2
Secure Copy 46.7 53.2
Snort Processing 76.1 94.9
Ansible Playbook 159.1 179.1
Total Cycle Time 247.7 281.3
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Figure 5.4: Results obtained with SQL Injection traffic
As for the accuracy it was important to detect SQL injection attacks, in the middle of all false
positive alerts, when using the proposed platform. With just Snort a total of 2343 alerts from 36
rules were written. Within this, 31 warnings about SQL injection were gatherer, including both
GET and POST attempts, use of function concat and 1=1. On the other hand The Packet Hunter
was able to confirm 2325 alerts from 23 different rules, however the detection of SQL injection
suffered because only 15 relevant alerts were collected, which is around 50% decrease in detection
rate. Even so the rules involved were the same and they allowed for a correct detection of the code
injection attempts.
5.5 Traffic with Denial of Service Attacks
Finally it was time to test the developed solution against the types of DOS attacks that were
depicted on section 4.2. Again this was done in a 15 minute interval using The Capturer, which
resulted in a 1.0 GB capture, totaling 2.8 GB of traffic with the base pcap. Because this specific
attack usually leaves behind many traces, it was expected that Snort took more time than the others
scenarios to process, with more alerts written.
In figure 5.5 is presented the results obtained in the three different tests performed. Again,
each of these was repeated 10 times and there is also shown a confidence interval of 95% for each
time in the figure. In this scenario, the times obtained are generally higher than the both previous
scenarios, but the Snort processing time for The Packet Hunter is still around three times less than
the State of the Art solution, since three Workers are being used this behavior is mathematically
correct.
In table 5.3 are written the minimum and maximum times achieved in all repetitions of The
Packet Hunter in this scenario. The times for Snort processing and running Ansible are consis-
tently higher than the times obtained with SQL and no attacks pcap, even though the capture file
used here is only 70 MB bigger than the SQL one, and 109 MB than legitimate traffic pcap. The
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Figure 5.5: Results obtained with Denial of Service traffic
total cycle time is always less than 15 minutes, so The Packet Hunter is free for the next capture
batch.
As for detection all four types of DOS depicted on section 4.2 were caught by Snort. When
running it in only one machine, a total of 28903 alerts were written, for 37 different rules. With
all these rules 21352 alerts were written because of irregular pings, 541 for slowloris, 115 for Low
Orbit Ion Cannon and 594 for slow HTTP attack. The Packet Hunter did not underperformed here,
as it actually got 21350 alerts for ping, 540 for slowloris, 106 for Low Orbit Ion Cannon and 579
for slow HTTP, with a total of 28882 alerts for 27 different rules. This represents a decrease in
detection of 0.07% which can be completely ignored.
Table 5.3: Time variations in The Packet Hunter for DOS traffic
Minimum time (s) Maximum time (s)
Division 51.2 60.3
Secure Copy 67.3 86.5
Snort Processing 84.2 132.1
Ansible Playbook 177.3 227.2
Total Cycle Time 295.2 364.9
5.6 Different Sized Captures
In this section is explained a different test performed on The Packet Hunter. The objective was to
have an idea of the impact that different sized pcaps would have on Snort. This experiment, and
the obtained results are presented next.
This test was done with a 1GB capture that was multiplied up to five times, and in each time
the pcap (or pcaps) were processed with The Packet Hunter, saving the most important times:
dividing, copying, running Ansible and total cycle time. To compare with this results the same
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Figure 5.6: Total cycle Time with The Packet Hunter versus one host Snort implementation
pcap was also analyzed on a single host, using Ansible to start the detection and fetching the
alerts.
In figure 5.6 is shown the results obtained. The times for the different combinations of pcap
when using The Packet Hunter are represented on bar graphs, while the plot line represents the
different times when dealing with a single host.
5.7 Hadoop and MapReduce
One important part of the tests performed on The Packet Hunter involved using MapReduce jobs
on the Workers that were,at the same moment, processing packets with Snort. The objective
was to access if both tasks could be done in parallel at the same time without degrading Snort’s
performance. The function used for the MapReduce job was a packet classification, developed by
students at FEUP.
The results obtained were presented in figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. On those images, what is
represented as Ansible time is the total of starting Snort (including loading all rules and configuring
preprocessors), processing the traffic capture and fetching the alerts produced. However when
using MapReduce, because both tasks are being done in parallel, the total time of running the
MapReduce jobs was also included in the Ansible time represented in the respective use case
scenarios.
When comparing the results obtained with using the traffic that as SQL injection attacks ( 5.4)
it is possible to observe that, even with the same exact pcap, the MapReduce solution took 33.1%
(28.1 seconds) more time in the Snort’s processing and 123.9% (203.4 seconds) more total Ansible
time. The total time used by MapReduce, since the job was submitted till it ended, was saved
through the web interface provided by OpenStack. Five of this jobs can be seen in figure 5.7.
Of the ten jobs that were started, an average of 213.2 +- 25.3 seconds were used by MapReduce
for concluding each one. Even though this time is less than the total Ansible time (367.5 +- 35.1
seconds) it is possible to affirm that Snort’s performance is degraded by other processing, but not
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Figure 5.7: Web interface results of MapReduce jobs
to an extent of being unbearable, since The Packet Hunter still processed everything before 15
minutes had passed, and another capture arrived.
5.8 Discussion
In this chapter the testbed in which all experiments were done is presented, the tests that The Packet
Hunter was subjected to were detailed and the final results were given. In summary, The Packet
Hunter was tested for its ability to detect intrusions while the performance was being measured.
Several different packet captures were used: one with legitimate traffic, another with SQL injection
attacks and the other under DOS. The results obtained were compared with the State of the Art
solution (Snort running on a single host) and for the special case of using MapReduce jobs along
with Snort intrusion detection.
In all scenarios it is possible to see that the developed platform was around three times more
fast than the State of the Art solution when it came to Snort’s processing time. Because the
cluster used for distributing workload also had three computer Workers, this is an acceptable and
predictable result. On the other hand it was not predicted that the use of MapReduce jobs in
conjunction with Snort’s processing was such a detriment to the proposed tool. In all cases the
processing time suffered consistent delays, and the total Ansible time had it even worse, mostly
because it had to wait for the end of the execution of the jobs. Even with all this delay the program
would always be done under the 15 minute mark.
The intrusion detecting when using The Packet Hunter was generally worse than a single host
Snort. When dealing with DOS attacks the alerts produced were almost the same, maybe because
they leave such high evidence in the traffic. Unfortunately SQL injection attempts were not as
well detected (...)
Another test performed involved studying the impact bigger pcaps would have on the proposed
platform, and the total detection cycle time was charted against the single host time for running
Snort. This resulted in an almost linear graph where it could be observed that the total cycle time
for The Packet Hunter is almost the same as the processing of Snort in a single host of the same
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pcap, even when including the time to divide the pcap and transfer it to the cluster, validating the
hypotheses that the developed solution can keep up with the State of the Art one, as far as time
consumed is concerned.
Will all the tests performed, it can be concluded that the proposed platform can be used in any
environment, with different sized captures and it can detect several cyber attacks. The Hunter has
different scripts that allow this tool to be very easily configured in a previously deployed cluster,
with integrated Hadoop support.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation theme had the objective of studying possible enhancements for intrusion detec-
tion, a field that needs all the help it can get to fight the ever-growing cyber crime. It was chosen to
work with Snort, one of the most used IDS based on predefined rules, and it was tackled its slow
performance when using a large amount of them. By using the distributed computing capabilities
of Hadoop with rule-based IDS we aim to distribute the detection to a cluster and addresses the
low processing speed that occurs when too much packets are analyzed and to many rules loaded,
while keeping the detection ratio with high standards.
In the time spent working for this dissertation thesis, some problems arose and difficulties
where encountered. Sometimes dead ends were reached and new ideas born from that. In the end
The Hunter was developed, a completely automated and scalable platform for distributing Snort’s
processing workload to a computer cluster. There were even implemented functions for using a
MapReduce job along with Snort, for further integration with the Hadoop cluster.
6.1 Contributions
The major contribution of this thesis was The Hunter, a tool which contains a number of scripts
that, in a completely automated and scalable way, distribute a intrusion detection program trough
a computer cluster. This tool has two very important scripts: The Packet Hunter, detailed on
section 3.3 and The Capturer, further explained on section 3.2.
This proposed platform was exhaustively tested in different ways. The intrusion detection
capability of The Packet Hunter had to be asserted and compared against a Snort implementation
in only one host. With this thesis we were able to prove that the developed tool could detect every
single attack made, although with an inferior detection rate. It could also handle different sized
pcaps in the same time proportions as the State of the Art counter part.
A study of Snort’s performance, when dealing with different types of traffic and working
together with MapReduce and the Hadoop framework is also a contribution of this dissertation.
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6.2 Future Work
To make The Packet Hunter more effective, and unlock its true potential, there are a number of
improvements that could be made, which are presented next:
• Change the algorithm of The Packet Hunter and The Capturer in order to completely remove
the step that divides the pcap. If this process is shifted to The Capturer, who would record
three pcaps instead of just one, there is a great time improvement that can be made. If this
time is removed from figure 5.6, the proposed solution will, theoretically, be more fast than
using only one machine.
• To achieve a more diversified IDS, the MapReduce job used in conjunction with The Packet
Hunter detection cycle could be change to an anomaly-based algorithm for intrusion detec-
tion, like outliers for instance. If this is implemented both rules and anomaly based intrusion
is being performed.
• If there is a spike in network traffic, there is a chance that The Packet Hunter will not process
everything before the next packet capture arrives, since it is always working in cycles. For
that reason, making the algorithm adaptive to the time used will bring robustness to the
proposed platform.
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